doi: 10.18178/ijtef.2023.14.4.758
Auction Pricing Mechanism of Construction Land Quota Based on Preference
Yang Deng
- School of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing, China.
Abstract
In order to study the impact of the location preference of construction land on the auction pricing strategy of construction land quota, this study constructs a first-price auction and two-price auction model for bidders participating in the construction land quota and construction land auction based on the sequential auction theory. Therefore, the role of preference is discussed, and finally the conclusion is verified by an example. The results show that under the two auction modes, preference has a positive impact on the bidding strategy of construction land quota and farmers’ expected income. Compared with sequential first-price auction, the bidding strategy of sequential second-price auction is more competitive, and the quota equilibrium bidding price and farmers’ income obtained are higher.
Keywords
- Construction land quota
- first-price auction
- second-price auction
- preference
How to Cite
Yang Deng, "Auction Pricing Mechanism of Construction Land Quota Based on Preference," International Journal of Trade, Economics and Finance, vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 68-73, 2023. https://doi.org/10.18178/ijtef.2023.14.4.758
Copyright & License
Copyright © 2023 by the authors. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited (CC BY 4.0).